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Predominant conceptual frameworks often describe peripersonal space (PPS)
as a single, distance-based, in-or-out zone within which stimuli elicit enhanced
neural and behavioural responses. Here we argue that this intuitive framework
is contradicted by neurophysiological and behavioural data. First, PPS-related
measures are not binary, but graded with proximity. Second, they are strongly
inﬂuenced by factors other than proximity, such as walking, tool use, stimulus
valence, and social cues. Third, many different PPS-related responses exist,
and each can be used to describe a different space. Here, we reconceptualise
PPS as a set of graded ﬁelds describing behavioural relevance of actions
aiming to create or avoid contact between objects and the body. This recon-
ceptualisation incorporates PPS into mainstream theories of action selection
and behaviour.
What Is Peripersonal Space?
Interactions occurring within the space near the body have been studied in a range of
disciplines, including ethology, neurophysiology, social science, architecture, and philosophy
[1–5]. Such studies have shown that many behavioural responses are increased when stimuli
occur near the body. This phenomenon makes evolutionary sense: a predator within striking
distance is more relevant than one farther away. Neuroscientiﬁc studies in both primates and
humans have suggested a physiological foundation for such behavioural modulations, leading
to the concept of peripersonal space (PPS).
But what is precisely meant when referring to PPS? This seemingly naïve question is in fact
not easy to answer, as demonstrated by the great deal of terminological and conceptual
confusion in the ﬁeld (Box 1). A clear conceptual framework is lacking. A current and
predominant perspective on PPS describes it as a single, distance-based, in-or-out space.
While a sharp spatial boundary may be intuitively appealing, neurophysiological and behav-
ioural data contradict the description of an in-or-out space. For example, many PPS-related
neurons respond to stimuli with graded or even reverse relationships to distance [6,7].
Behavioural responses in humans are also graded with distance [8–10]. These ﬁndings
challenge a simple in-or-out deﬁnition. There is also reason to question a purely distance-
based deﬁnition of PPS. PPS responses are inﬂuenced by factors such as walking, motion of
body parts, tool use, stimulus trajectory, and stimulus valence [11–15]. Finally, PPS is often
presented as ‘the’ PPS, implying it to be a single entity. However, many different PPS-related
responses exist [8,16], and each can be used to describe a different space. These facts call
the notion of a single PPS into question.
While conceptualising PPS as a single distance-based in-or-out zone may allow for efﬁcient
summary of results, it is increasingly clear that this simple framework has become a source of
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data misinterpretations and conceptual misunderstandings. Here, we offer a new framework.
Rather than describe PPS simply as an in-or-out zone, we propose reconceptualising PPS as a
set of graded response ﬁelds. Each ﬁeld describes the magnitude of a certain physiological or
perceptual measure that reﬂects the behavioural relevance of a stimulus to a given action or set
of actions. Speciﬁcally, we refer to those actions that aim to either create or avoid contact
between objects and the body.
This framework contains three concepts with important implications: (i) a ﬁeld allows PPS
measures to change gradually with distance, rather than to deﬁne an in-or-out space; (ii) a set of
ﬁelds reﬂects the fact that there are many different PPS measures showing different response
proﬁles; and (iii) behavioural relevance to actions aiming to create or avoid contact between
objects and the body explains the functional signiﬁcance of the values composing the PPS ﬁeld
of each action, and the fact that factors other than proximity affect PPS measures. We believe
that this framework can explain seemingly anomalous empirical observations, and resolve
some of the deﬁnitional and conceptual issues affecting the ﬁeld.
More Than an ‘In-or-Out’ Bubble
In probably the ﬁrst observations of a link between brain function and the processing of
sensory stimuli occurring near the body, the British neurologist Lord Brain [17] noticed that
Box 1. Deﬁnitional Issues with Peripersonal Space
Here, we provide examples of the terminological and conceptual confusion in the existing literature about peripersonal
space (PPS). This term is typically used with three different meanings, as described below.
Meaning 1: the portion of space within a given Euclidian distance of the body (e.g.: ‘[ . . . ] the space immediately around
the animal (peripersonal space)’ [22]).
Meaning 2: the space within which certain physiological or behavioural responses are larger when the stimuli eliciting
them occur near the body (e.g. ‘The spatial extent to which visuotactile interactions strongly occur is known as
visuotactile peripersonal space (hereafter called “peripersonal space”)’ [83]).
Meaning 3: the mechanisms through which the brain represents the space near the body (e.g. ‘a multisensory
representation of the space surrounding the body, i.e. the peripersonal space (PPS)’ [85]).
While meaning #1 poses no problems, it is not physiologically interesting: in this meaning, PPS is immutable and exists
regardless of the individual being alive or dead, and therefore is not adequate to explain the phenomenon that PPS can
change in size. When this occurs, meanings #2 and/or #3 are invoked. However, a serious problem arises when
meanings #2 and #3 are considered equivalent. Typically, when it is observed that a physiological response function
changes with proximity (i.e., PPS in meaning #2), it is also presented as evidence that the neural representation of near
space (i.e., PPS in meaning #3) expands, contracts, or changes shape. However, this equivalence between ‘the space
within which certain physiological or perceptual responses are larger when the stimuli eliciting them occur near the body’
and ‘the mechanisms through which the brain represents the space near the body’ is false. While it is true that a measure
dependent on spatial proximity (meaning #2) tells us something about how the brain represents near space (meaning
#3), it is not true that a modulation of the measure dependent on spatial proximity (meaning #2) necessarily means that
the brain has changed how it represents near space (and that ‘PPS has expanded/contracted’; meaning #3). In fact, this
false equivalence can even be found when PPS is initially deﬁned geometrically (i.e., using meaning #1), but is later said
to change in size or shape to accommodate observations. These various deﬁnitions are often used even within the same
sentence, for example ‘Peripersonal space (PPS), deﬁned as the space immediately surrounding the body [meaning #1],
is now well accepted as a region of integration of somatosensory, visual, and auditory information [meaning #2]. It is a
privileged interface for interaction with nearby objects [meaning #3]’ [86]. Notably, we are not exempt from this criticism
ourselves: ‘The defensive peripersonal space (DPPS) is a portion of space surrounding the body [meaning #1] with a
crucial protective function [meaning #3]. Whenever a potentially dangerous stimulus approaches or enters this area, the
individual engages in protective actions aimed at avoiding or minimising harm [meaning #2]’ [42]. Such conﬂations of
meanings are likely to cause conceptual misunderstandings.
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certain lesions of parietal cortex led to perceptual problems in near space, but not in far
space. During the 1950s, the Swiss zoologist Heini Hediger observed that behavioural
responses depended upon the distance of the triggering stimulus. He reported that stimuli
near the animal (inside a so-called ‘ﬂight zone’) elicited a ﬂight response, whereas stimuli
outside the ﬂight zone elicited no response [4,18]. In 1969, the inﬂuential anthropologist
Edward Hall, the father of proxemics, published a book about the importance of space to
human behaviour [3]. He distinguished between intimate space (up to 45 cm), personal space
(up to 1.2 m), social space (up to 3.6 m), and public space. While their empirical evidence did
not support the existence of multiple distinct spaces, these authors nonetheless opted to
present their ﬁndings as though there were multiple distinct spaces, probably to ease the
understanding of the reader. While informative, these early seminal studies therefore implicitly
set the tone that near and far space have sharp boundaries. Studies and interpretations over
the next several decades adopted this simple framework. However, a closer look at many of
these studies challenges such a framework.
For example, studies of bimodal single neurons in macaques illustrate how data and interpre-
tation often disconnect [7,19–23]. In these studies, bimodal neurons were identiﬁed in both
cortical and subcortical structures (putamen, parietal, and premotor areas). These neurons
responded not only to somatosensory stimuli, but also to visual or auditory stimuli presented in
spatial proximity to the somatosensory receptive ﬁeld. The authors emphasised the larger
neural response magnitudes to stimuli in near space versus the smaller neural response
magnitudes to stimuli in far space. To illustrate these ﬁndings, such neurons were often
described as demarcating zones of space, represented as bubbles with clear boundaries
[24] (Figure 1). However, these boundaries were simply lines of arbitrary response magnitude
[25]. Other authors similarly deﬁned such boundaries as the ‘part of space which gave
consistent responses’, again resulting in arbitrary and ill-deﬁned in-or-out zones [26]. The fact
that some neurons did respond preferentially to stimuli occurring near a given body part was
presented as the most novel and memorable aspect of these studies. Therefore, on the surface,
these neurophysiological studies appeared to conﬁrm, at the neural level, the conception by
seminal studies of a sharply deﬁned ‘in-or-out’ near space.
However, the data in these same studies clearly illustrate that response magnitudes are not
simple step-like functions but have far more complex properties. In many cases, the responses
appear to be gradual, rather than step-wise, proximity functions [6,7,21,26–28] (Figure 1).
Indeed, while the response magnitude of some neurons increases rapidly with stimulus
proximity between two consecutive tested points, thus deﬁning what appears to be a ‘sharply
delimited receptive ﬁeld’ [7], most neurons show a less steep response gradient [7]. In addition
to this graded response, a sizeable portion of multimodal neurons (e.g., 5% of recorded
neurons in ventral premotor cortex [24]) exhibit receptive ﬁelds that extend further than reaching
distance, sometimes even to the end of the room [7,25]. Therefore, neuronal response
functions are not only more continuous than usually presented, but some of these response
functions also encompass a much larger area than commonly reported. Finally, some neurons
even show the reverse of the expected near versus far relationship: in both premotor and
parietal regions, they respond less strongly to visual stimuli near their somatosensory receptive
ﬁeld than to visual stimuli slightly further away in space [7,21,26]. Taken together, these
empirical data demonstrate that a step-like proximity function is an inadequate description
of PPS.
These interpretive issues are not limited to neurophysiology experiments: the psychophysical
literature suffers analogous oversimpliﬁcations. At ﬁrst, most psychophysical experiments
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would often test only two conditions: near versus far. Such ‘near versus far’ experiments were
performed using various behavioural measures, such as line bisection [29], visuotactile extinc-
tion [30], audiotactile extinction [31], visuotacile interaction [32], the hand-blink reﬂex (HBR)
[33], and temporal-order judgements of nociceptive stimulation [34]. The desire to keep
experimental design and analysis simple is understandable, and not necessarily a fatal ﬂaw.
Indeed, most researchers are aware that the responses change continuously between the
sampled near and far positions: sampling two points along a continuum does not negate that
continuum. However, the binary experimental design implies a binary response pattern,
precluding a more complete conceptual understanding of PPS.
Even in the subset of psychophysical experiments where more stimulus locations were
tested, and the corresponding responses clearly showed a graded fall-off, authors often
continued to present results as ‘in-or-out’ zones using simple summary statistics, such as
the point of ﬁrst increase over baseline activity [35], or the mid-point of a ﬁtted sinusoidal
function [36–38]. Even when it is explicitly made clear that changes in response magni-
tude from near space to far space are gradual, for example in line-bisection work [39,40]






























































Figure 1. Describing Peripersonal Space (PPS): Gradient or Boundary? Many behavioural and neurophysiological responses have been labelled as PPS
measures because their magnitude increases with body proximity. However, even when clearly graded with proximity to a body part, PPS measures are often described
using binary ‘in-or-out’ metrics and wording (left side of each panel). This approach often consists in choosing some cut-off value to deﬁne the PPS ‘size’. Examples of
such cut-off values are the furthest distance at which consistent modulation is observed (A) and the midpoint of a ﬁtted function (B,C). (A–C) show examples of how PPS
data could be described as binary ‘in-or-out’ metrics [left side of (A–C)], but more faithfully reﬂect the data when displayed as a continuous, graded response ﬁeld [right
side of (A–C)]. (A) Bimodal visuotactile neurons ﬁre more when visual stimuli are close to their tactile receptive ﬁelds [25]. However, as discussed in the main text, this is an
oversimpliﬁed description. (B) The hand-blink reﬂex is elicited by stimulation of the median nerve at the wrist, and increases in magnitude when the hand is closer to the
face [35]. (C) Reaction times (RT) to somatosensory stimuli on the face (green), hand (blue), and chest (red) are faster when auditory or visual stimuli are concomitantly
presented closer to those body parts [38]. Other types of visuotactile and audiotactile integration have also been shown to increase in magnitude with proximity the body
[87]. Data reproduced, with permission, from [9,25,88].
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More Than Proximity: Many Variables Inﬂuence PPS Measures
Although proximity to the body or a body part is a crucial factor determining the spatial
properties of PPS measures, it has become clear through recent experimental work that many
other factors affect these measures.
Indeed, in addition to proximity, PPS responses are affected by stimulus movement
parameters, such as speed and direction. This phenomenon had already been observed
in the original recordings of bimodal neurons in macaques. For example, 80% of neurons
in the ventral-intraparietal area (VIP) respond more than twice as much to stimuli moving in a
preferred direction [7]. Even bimodal visuotactile neurons selectively responding to looming
stimuli do not necessarily have monotonic response functions. While the majority of these
neurons do respond most strongly to stimuli in the nearest stimulus position tested (e.g.,
5 cm from the body part with the relevant tactile receptive ﬁeld), some respond better to
stimuli located at further distances (e.g., 20 cm from the somatosensory receptive ﬁeld),
and a few even further than that [7]. Furthermore, some bimodal VIP neurons respond
preferentially to receding stimuli [6]. Interestingly, in these cells, the tactile response was
triggered when the tactile stimulus was removed from, rather than applied to, the receptive
ﬁeld; what could colloquially be called ‘not-there-anymore’ neurons. In fact, VIP neurons
include so much directional information that the borders of that area were originally
functionally identiﬁed as the points at which direction-selective visual responses could
be found [6,7,25]. Recordings from VIP neurons can even be used to reliably decode self-
motion and heading direction relative to the environment [43,44], although, crucially, these
neurons are not causally involved in heading perception [45]. Taken together, these
observations show that the magnitude of PPS measures is not just determined by proxim-
ity. In fact, because of differential sensitivity to movement, two VIP neurons with the same
tactile receptive ﬁeld could show different response magnitudes even when the responses
are elicited by identical visual stimuli. Cortical regions other than VIP also contain neurons
sensitive to large numbers of stimulus features in addition to proximity, such as size,
direction, speed, rotation, active and passive joint movement, and even the semantic
value of the stimulus (e.g., some respond more strongly to snakes than to apples)
[21,25,28,46].
Recent ﬁndings in humans have also shown that many other factors not related to the current
stimulus position can inﬂuence PPS-related neurophysiological and behavioural responses.
These factors include walking [11,47], gravitational cues [41], vestibular cues [48], motion of
body parts [12,49–51], stimulus direction [38], stimulus trajectory [15], and even higher-level
factors, such as stimulus valence and semantics [14,37,52,53] and environmental landscape
[54]. PPS measures can also be affected by training or learning [16]. These effects, such as the
well-characterised modulation of the response ﬁelds of multimodal neurons after tool use [13],
provide additional strong support to the idea that stimulus proximity alone cannot adequately
explain changes in PPS measures.
This wealth of additional factors determining PPS response magnitudes shows clearly that the
concept of an in-or-out, near-or-far space leads to problems in reasoning. For example, when
PPS measures are altered by stimulus movement, researchers have claimed that PPS or ‘the
near space’ has changed in size. This has even been rephrased as ‘far becomes near’ [55].
However, given that many factors in addition to stimulus proximity can alter the PPS-related
measure, the reverse inference underlying these claims is likely incorrect [56]. The reasoning
has a clear element of circularity: ‘when a stimulus is close, the magnitude of a measure
increases. Therefore, when the magnitude of a measure is increased, a stimulus is close’. This
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is not logically sound, because there can be factors other than proximity that cause the
observation that the magnitude of the measure was increased. This insistence on proximity
as the most important factor may turn out to be a historical legacy whose time has come. In
other words, we have staked a larger importance on the factor proximity than on the factor
movement direction, only because we have assumed that the measure denotes a space. In
reality, there is no reason to think that, from a functional perspective, stimulus proximity is more
important to PPS measures than any of the other factors they are sensitive to.
Interestingly, the same issue of the unjustiﬁed primacy of space might apply to the functional
interpretation of place and grid cells. Classically, these cells have been considered to code the
position of an animal relative to the environment, due to the strong correlation between their
ﬁring and the location of the animal [57,58]. However, recent evidence that these cells are not
solely sensitive to spatial information [59] has led to the novel idea that place and grid cells do
not represent space speciﬁcally, but instead code the value of a given state [60]. This is
particularly relevant for the current discourse on PPS, not only because it provides evidence
that a greater understanding of the system might be gained by revoking the primacy of spatial
location, but also because the hippocampus and parieto-premotor loop likely work tightly
together to plan and coordinate actions [61].
More Than One Space: Many Different PPS Measures
As described above, many PPS-related measures exist. They range from audiotactile integra-
tion, which is maximal nearest the stimulated body part [38,62], to the ﬁring of different
visuotactile macaque neurons, which increases when visual stimuli are closer to different body
regions [19]. A feature that these measures have in common, and that has caused them to be
grouped under the banner of PPS, is that their magnitude increases with proximity to a certain
body part. However, what this body part is and how the magnitude depends on proximity
changes from measure to measure. This is represented in Figure 2A, which shows how different
types of biological measure, differently dependent on body proximity, yield different PPS ﬁelds.
Furthermore, as described in the previous section, PPS measures are affected not only by
proximity, but also by other factors, whose contributions to each measure vary.
Thus, due to the multitude of PPS-related response functions and their different sensitivity to
factors different from body proximity, referring to ‘the’ PPS as if it were a single entity does not
bring clarity to the discourse.
An attempt to reconcile the notion of a single PPS and the variety of PPSs derived from the many
PPS-related measures is the suggestion that the single PPS is organised in a modular fashion [62].
However, this suggestion begs several difﬁcult questions: in which manner does ‘the’ PPS arise
from its various modules? Is it a weighted sum of all the PPS-related measures? And, if so, how are
we to choose the weights? As detailed in the following section, we propose to shift perspective,
consider the functional signiﬁcance of the many PPS-related measures, and abandontheconcept
of a single PPS, for which there is currently a lack of empirical evidence.
PPS as a Set of Contact-Related Action Fields
Here, we offer a reconceptualization of PPS that solves the issues arising from the notion that
PPS is (i) a single entity; (ii) with a binary in-or-out boundary; and (iii) mostly dependent on
stimulus proximity to the body. We propose that PPS be considered a set of continuous ﬁelds
describing physiological or perceptual responses that reﬂect the behavioural relevance of
actions aiming to create or avoid contact between objects and the body.
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Panel A: Heterogeneity of PPS ﬁelds
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(See figure legend on the bottom of the next page.)
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This formulation has several important concepts: ﬁeld, a set (of ﬁelds), and contact-related
behavioural relevance.
We use the term ‘ﬁeld’ in the same sense that it is used in modern Physics (Figure 3), which is to
express a quantity that has a magnitude for each point in space and time [63]. Given that this
magnitude can change continuously in space, the concept of a ﬁeld accommodates the
observations that PPS measures change gradually with distance in three dimensions. Impor-
tantly, a ﬁeld does not necessitate PPS to be an ‘in-or-out’ zone, and allows multiple separated
regions of nonzero magnitude.
The concept that there is not a single PPS ﬁeld, but instead a set of ﬁelds, is compatible with the
observation that different PPS measures show different response proﬁles. Rather than forcing
us to choose which (or which combination) of the many PPS measures best represent ‘the’
PPS, or ‘what is near’, the concept of a set of ﬁelds allows us to see the various PPS measures
as separate instances of a wider class of responses with some common functional signiﬁcance.
The concept of contact-related behavioural relevance (i.e., the relevance of actions aiming to
create or avoid contact between objects and the body) explains the functional signiﬁcance of
the values comprising a PPS ﬁeld. Although the relevance of PPS to action has been stated and
accepted by many, exactly how PPS is related to action remains unclear [11,16,24,49,50,64–
70]. We propose that the values of PPS ﬁelds reﬂect the relevance of potential actions that aim
to either create or avoid contact between a stimulus and a body part.
The concept of contact-related behavioural relevance ﬁts well with the perspective of interactive
behaviour: rather than conceptualising behaviour as a stepwise process from sensory input to
cognition to motor output, the interactive behaviour framework describes behaviour as a set of
simultaneous processes specifying potential motor actions and selecting among them [71].
Notably, the parietal and premotor cortices (i.e., the cortices also thought to underlie the
modulation of many PPS measures) are likely cortical sites where potential actions are speciﬁed
within the interactive behaviour framework [61,71,72] (Figure 4). Furthermore, contact-related
behavioural relevance also explains the relationship between many PPS measures and impact
prediction [15,73,74]: the probability of impact of a stimulus is strongly related to the behav-
ioural relevance of an action aiming to avoid or create contact [9]. Interestingly, recent views
have suggested that impact prediction is the main role of PPS [75]. While such a role does
explain that some factors other than proximity (e.g., velocity or direction of movement) affect
PPS measures, it still does not explain, for example, the effect of other factors, such as stimulus
valence [14], lateral motion [7] (i.e., in a direction not likely to directly cause impact with the
individual), and social interactions [76], factors that are instead explained by considering
contact-related action relevance.
Figure 2. Many Peripersonal Space (PPS) Fields, Affected by Many Factors. As detailed in the main text, we propose a reconceptualisation of PPS as a set of
ﬁelds reﬂecting the relevance of actions aimed at creating or avoiding contact between objects and the body. This ﬁgure illustrates the idea that there is not a single PPS,
but that instead there are many PPS ﬁelds. (A) Heterogeneity of PPS ﬁelds. Different PPS ﬁelds can be derived from the many types of biological measure that differently
depend on spatial proximity. Here, we show as an example the PPS ﬁelds derived from the modulation exerted by the proximity between a visual stimulus and the body
on different biological measures: (i) the somatosensory-evoked eye blinking (green); (ii) the response of a visuotactile single neuron with a somatosensory receptive ﬁeld
on the chest (red); and (iii) the reaction times (RT) to somatosensory stimuli delivered to the hand (blue). Note how the same visual stimulus in an identical position elicits
different responses and deﬁnes PPS ﬁelds with different spatial features. (B) Not just proximity: additional factors modulate PPS-related measures. Although the
magnitude of PPS-related measures is commonly affected by proximity to a body part, many other factors also affect these PPS measures. Such factors include various
types of motion: motion of a visual stimulus (i), stimulated limb (ii), and the entire body (iii) can all cause expansion of the response ﬁelds. Factors independent of motion
also affect PPS measures: tool use can expand response ﬁelds (iv), a protective screen can deform them (v), and frightening sounds can expand them (vi). Response
ﬁelds are colour-coded by the body part near which their magnitude is maximal: face (green), hand (blue), and trunk (red). Data reproduced, with permission, from
[11,13,14,25,38,54,89].
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(Figure legend continued on the bottom of the next page.)
Peripersonal Space (PPS) as Action-Relevance Fields. We conceptualise PPS as a set of ﬁelds reﬂecting
the relevance of actions aimed at creating or avoiding contact between objects and the body. We borrow the term ‘ﬁeld’
from modern physics, to express a quantity that has a magnitude for each point in space and time [63]. (A) Magnetic ﬁeld
strength decreases proportionally to the cube of the distance from a coil. Therefore, when approaching a magnet holding a
metallic object, one perceives a ‘boundary’ where the attractive force becomes detectable. Still, the magnetic ﬁeld covers
the entirety of space, although its strength becomes inﬁnitesimal. (B) Similarly, PPS ﬁeld values can be inﬁnitesimal in most
of the space far from the body, although this does not mean that they have zero value. Admittedly, considering such distant
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The large body of literature investigating PPS through behavioural and physiological measures
provides many examples of actions directly related to creating or avoiding contact between
objects and the body. For example, the blink reﬂex aims to avoid contact between a dangerous
stimulus and the eye; thus, it is behaviourally useful that its magnitude depends on the likelihood
that astimulus hits the eye, a likelihood that, in turn, depends on the proximity between the
stimulus and the face (although by no means only on the proximity) [9,54]. Similarly, the
stimulation of some multimodal VIP neurons elicits defensive postures aimed at preventing
contact between a stimulus and a particular body part [77]. This variety of actions also explains
why the PPS ﬁelds derived from, for example, the HBR and certain VIP neurons can be vastly
different: HBR responses are increased when stimuli are near the face, whereas a speciﬁc VIP
response might be stronger when the stimulus is near, say, the forearm [6]. It is clear why these
measures are related to the physical space near the body (Box 1), but it is equally clear that
these measures deﬁne a set of PPS ﬁelds of necessarily different shapes and sizes. In other
words, the PPS ﬁeld derived from a particular response will be shaped by whatever actions are
linked to that response (Figures 2 and 4). Thus, the brain estimates the value of external events
differently for the behaviour triggered by these events. This estimation is dependent on spatial
location in egocentric coordinates, but the precise spatial relationship differs for the type of
action required given a particular sensory event.
When considering certain PPS-related measures, the relation to actions aiming to create or
avoid contact is less clear. For example, take the PPS ﬁeld derived from reaction times to a
tactile stimulus on the hand while an auditory stimulus approaches it. At ﬁrst glance, the act of
pressing a button might appear to have nothing to do with creating or avoiding contact between
the hand and the source of the sound. Again, the interactive behaviour perspective helps
resolve this issue, if one assumes that multiple simultaneous competing actions are being
prepared at all times [71]. Thus, the entire set of potential actions related to contact between the
hand and the sound source becomes more relevant with proximity to the hand. This interpre-
tation is neurophysiologically plausible. Given that neural population coding of actions dictates
that similar actions share network activity, any action triggered by stimulation of the hand (e.g.,
a button press) should share some of its network with those actions aimed at creating or
avoiding contact between the hand and the sound source [78]. Therefore, as the sound
approaches the hand, any hand-related actions are more readily enacted, resulting in shorter
reaction times as a function of sound proximity. In this manner, most PPS ﬁelds likely display
some summation of relevance of a set of actions, rather than a single action.
In fact, evidence from several PPS measures that do not immediately appear to be related to
creating or avoiding contact also supports the perspective proposed here. One example
comes from a reaction time study in which participants responded with a button press to
stimuli delivered either to the hand, face, or torso. Expectedly, the proximity of looming auditory
stimuli shortened reaction times for the tactile stimuli delivered to all these locations. By
contrast, the proximity of receding auditory stimuli only shortened reaction times when tactile
PPS ﬁeld values is rarely phenomenologically useful, but it does become important in those instances of PPS measures
with either extremely large response ﬁelds [24] or spatially separate regions with strong responses [90]. This panel shows
the PPS ﬁeld for the defensive eye blink [9]. Envisioning PPS as a set of response ﬁelds avoids the oversimpliﬁcation of
considering it a single and binary ‘in-or-out’ bubble, and it allows a richer description of the actual response properties in
space. (C) The notion of contact-related action ﬁelds ﬁts well with the interactive behaviour framework [71]. This framework,
exempliﬁed here for visually guided movements, postulates that neural populations in the parieto-premotor loop transform
visual input into representations of potential actions. The strength of each action representation is also inﬂuenced by basal
ganglia and prefrontal regions so that it reﬂects the relevance of that action depending on the environmental circum-
stances. Reproduced, with permission, from [71] (C).
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Scenario 1: crocodile and tree Scenario 2: no tree




PosiƟon of crocodile PosiƟon of crocodile
Climb tree field Climb tree field
Run away field Run away field
Figure 4.
(Figure legend continued on the bottom of the next page.)
Effect of Context on Peripersonal Space (PPS) Fields. Consider two possible actions when facing a
predator such as a crocodile: climbing a tree (red) or running away (blue). Given that the relevance of these actions
depends on the position of the predator (second row), any measure reﬂecting the relevance of these actions can be used to
map out a response ﬁeld in space (third and fourth rows). Examples of these measures might be the probability of
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stimuli were delivered to the hand [38]. This clearly supports the framework provided here:
many actions of the arm, face, and torso are relevant to avoiding a looming stimulus. However,
there are more actions relevant to a receding stimulus executed by the arm (e.g., reaching to
grasp) than by the torso or the head (except, perhaps, chest bumping or head butting). A
second example is that, after tool use, cross-modal congruency is only strengthened near the
tip of the tool, where contact with objects is made or avoided [79]. A ﬁnal example comes from
experiments investigating the effect of computer mouse use on reaction times to somatosen-
sory stimuli delivered to the hand. Only during computer mouse use entailing making contact
between the mouse cursor and some objects on the screen are these reaction times shortened
when auditory stimuli are delivered near the computer screen where the mouse pointer is
located [80]. All these examples indicate that the relevance of actions aiming to create or avoid
contact determines PPS-related reaction times.
The observation that some PPS-related responses remain graded with proximity to a body part
even when a transparent screen is placed between that body part and the stimulus (such as in
[81]) could at a ﬁrst glance suggest that such responses do not reﬂect contact-related actions.
However, not all sensory information is considered at every stage of neural computation:
neurons and networks underlying PPS measures are unlikely to have access to perfect
situational information. In fact, many of these measures represent neural responses that
are steps towards the ultimate selection of actions, and these steps, by deﬁnition, only take
into account partial amounts of information, a principle neatly summarised in the affordance
competition hypothesis [71]. Furthermore, defensive responses that rely mostly on early stages
of processing offer a clear survival advantage: they do not need to integrate high-level
information and, thus, can be more quickly and effectively enacted, at the cost of possibly
having performed a useless action [81]. Intuitive examples of this point are common. While
watching a movie or driving a car, sudden approaching objects on or behind the screen can
often elicit overt avoidance responses, even though the person is (upon reﬂection, thus at the
high cognitive level) fully aware of their safety.
The proposed reconceptualisation intuitively explains why factors other than proximity affect
PPS. Consider how varying the context might affect the action choice of an animal. If the animal
observes a rock rolling towards it with high speed, the animal would need to deploy a motor
repertoire vastly different than if the object were moving tangentially to it. This would be the case
even if the rock began in the same location (i.e., at the same distance from the animal).
Environmental factors might also affect action choices and, thus, PPS ﬁelds. If an animal is
faced with a predator, the animal might behave very differently if there were a large tree to climb,
compared with if there were a small cave to scurry into. Thus, the PPS ﬁeld derived from the
same measure might be different depending on the contextual change represented by the
presence of the tree or the cave (Figure 4). In fact, the proposed reconceptualisation also allows
us to understand why and how PPS ﬁelds might interact within and between individuals [82].
observing the given action, the ﬁring rate of a neuron that is involved in preparing the action, or the reaction time to a
sudden tactile stimulus on the body. In this perspective, the ﬁelds described by the magnitude of these measures are
instances of PPS ﬁelds: ﬁelds that reﬂect the relevance of actions aimed at avoiding or creating contact. This con-
ceptualisation (i) allows PPS measures to change gradually with distance; (ii) reﬂects the fact that many different PPS
measures show different response proﬁles; and (iii) explains the functional signiﬁcance of the values comprising the PPS
ﬁeld of each action, and the fact that factors other than proximity affect PPS measures. This example encapsulates those
three points. In the presence of a crocodile and a tree (left column), climbing is an action the relevance of which increases
with the proximity between the crocodile and the individual, unless the crocodile is interposed between the two (red). In the
same situation, running away (blue) is a less beneﬁcial action unless the crocodile is interposed between the tree and the
individual. By contrast, in the absence of a tree (right column), climbing becomes irrelevant, while running away becomes
more relevant.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, December 2018, Vol. 22, No. 12 1087
For example, when considering a given individual surrounded by other agents, the relevance of
the actions available to that individual depends not only on the position of other agents, but also
on the set of actions available to them (i.e., their various contact-related PPS ﬁelds). Thus, social
inﬂuences on PPS measures can be explained by postulating that we use our own coding of the
contact-related action relevance of others as input to generate our own PPS ﬁelds.
Whether an action aims to create or avoid contact with a stimulus can also explain the fact that
many PPS measures involve visuotactile and audiotactile integrations [83]. These contact-
related actions link the perception of an object in external space, through sight or sound, to the
perception of an object on the surface of the body, through touch. The idea of ﬁelds underlying
such actions also resolves the apparent conﬂict with what, in the past, has been deﬁned
‘appetitive’ versus ‘defensive’ PPS [84]. Indeed, both grasping and defensive actions have the
common denominator of determining whether contact is created or avoided between an object
and a body part, while occasionally being affected differently by variables such as object
valence and movement.
Thus, the fact that factors other than proximity affect PPS ﬁelds arises naturally under our
framework. This is in contrast to previous interpretations, which often considered these non-
proximity effects as interesting exceptions to the rule. For example, when a biological measure
considered to reﬂect PPS is altered by an experimental manipulation (e.g., a line bisection task
is altered by tool use), it has often been concluded that ‘far becomes near’ [51,55], or
‘peripersonal space expands’ [41,47,85]. However, a modulation of a measure that depends,
among other factors, on proximity says nothing about what nearness itself actually is, and
concluding that ‘far becomes near’ or that ‘the PPS expands’ is, at least, a gross oversimpliﬁ-
cation. We argue that PPS ﬁelds are so dependent on nonproximity factors that proximity and
nonproximity factors should no longer be considered separately. Rather, they should all be
considered together as inputs to a set of functions that take into account many separate
variables, one of which is proximity. This perspective of PPS as a set of continuous relevance-
estimation ﬁelds by no means implies that the nervous system does not differentially process
stimuli in near and far space, but does imply that there is no single strict boundary between the
neural representations of events in ‘far’ and ‘near’ regions.
Concluding Remarks
Many physiological measures have been linked to the concept of PPS because of their
dependence on proximity to the body. However, not only is the concept of PPS ill-deﬁned
(Box 1), but the measures used to investigate PPS also: (i) do not deﬁne clear in-or-out zones; (ii)
can be used to map out many different response ﬁelds; and (iii) are differently modulated by
factors other than proximity. Here, we have provided a unifying perspective that accounts for all
these facts: PPS can be understood as a set of continuous ﬁelds describing physiological
responses, which reﬂect the behavioural relevance of actions aiming to create or avoid contact
between objects and the body. This perspective ﬁts into current systems-level understanding of
brain function: parieto-premotor circuits describe the relevance of potential actions [71], and
PPS ﬁelds reﬂect the relevance of a subset of these actions: namely, those dependent on
proximity to the body due to their contact-related goal. Thus, this perspective on PPS also
allows future research to integrate PPS ﬁndings with emerging new perspectives on hippo-
campal place and grid cells as state value predictors (see Outstanding Questions) [60]. Such
future research will likely not only shed light on the interactions between egocentric and
allocentric coding of space [61], but also allow a closer collaboration between neuroscience
and robotics [86] by framing the issues faced by both ﬁelds in a common, practical language of
action relevance in the real world.
Outstanding Questions
What is the link between PPS ﬁelds
and hippocampal place ﬁelds? A cur-
sory glance suggests that they com-
plement each other to deliver a full
representation of space. However,
there could be more to such a link,
as suggested by combining recent
advances in understanding the func-
tional signiﬁcance of place cells with
the proposed perspective on PPS.
How necessary are PPS ﬁelds for inter-
acting with the environment? Would it
be possible to create an artiﬁcial agent
able to move effectively without such
response ﬁelds measurable from its
internal machinery?
Can PPS ﬁelds be measured in spe-
cies other than primates? Can one
track the phylogenetic emergence of
the hierarchical rules governing the rel-
evance of contact-related actions
across species?
Can PPS ﬁelds be derived during nat-
ural behaviour? What information
would such ecologically more valid
experiments provide?
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